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Ending the Blame Game on Educational Inequity: 
A Study of “High Flying” Schools and NCLB 
Douglas N. Harris 
Florida State University 
Executive Summary 
One of the central purposes of public education is to provide opportunities for all 
children to learn and excel.  Unfortunately, while gaps in educational outcomes have 
indeed improved substantially over the past half-century, poor and minority students are 
still well behind their more advantaged counterparts.  There is also evidence that the 
positive trend has reversed course—that educational outcomes are now becoming even 
more inequitable.   
Recent policy studies by the Education Trust and Heritage Foundation have tried 
to identify “high-flying” schools—schools that help students reach very high levels of 
achievement, despite significant disadvantages.  This policy brief demonstrates three 
major problems with the findings of these reports.  (1) Due to questionable 
methodological assumptions, the number high-flying schools is significantly smaller than 
the number reported in those studies; (2) The numbers in these reports are being misused 
in a way that that understates the significance of, and need to address, socioeconomic 
disadvantages; and (3) these reports fail to directly address the vast amount of evidence 
that inequity in educational outcomes is primarily due to students’ social and economic 
disadvantages.   
It is therefore recommended that:  
1. Policy makers continue the recent focus on measurable student outcomes, 
such as test scores, but redesign policies to hold educators accountable only 
for those factors within their control;  
2. Policy makers take a comprehensive approach to school improvement that 
starts in schools but extends into homes and communities, and addresses basic 
disadvantages caused by poverty; and  
3. All educational stakeholders acknowledge that educational inequity is caused 
by problems in both schools and communities—and avoid trying to blame the 
problem on schools alone.   
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Background 
The achievement gap between students of various racial, social, and economic 
groups is large and growing.  For example, between whites and African-Americans, the 
size of the achievement gap ranges from 29 to 37 percentile points.  Between whites and 
Hispanics, the gap is 16 to 34 percentile points.1  Strong signs suggest these gaps have 
worsened recently after decades of improvement.2
All parts of the political spectrum seem to agree that these educational inequities 
represent a significant problem.  There is also strong evidence and agreement that 
students’ social and economic disadvantages are substantial causes of the problem.3  Poor 
nutrition and illness cause students (a) to miss school more often and (b) to be less 
prepared to learn when they attend.4  Within the disadvantaged home, parents often have 
relationships with their children that are, emotionally and physically, less healthy.5  These 
unhealthy relationships are reinforced in part by economic pressures that induce conflicts 
between parents and children.6  The combination of these factors and other effects is 
shown to be worse as students remain in poverty for longer periods of time.7  Of course, 
many parents living in poverty are able to successfully navigate and avoid these potential 
problems, and some parents with high incomes are not great parents, but the general 
patterns described here are quite strong. 
 
Perhaps the best evidence on students’ disadvantages comes from a recent study 
of children when they first enter kindergarten.  Because these students have not been in 
school, any observed inequity can only be attributed to family, community, and related 
factors that are outside of school control.  This evidence suggests that the achievement 
levels of African-American kindergarteners are 34 percentile points below the levels of 
white kindergartners—roughly the same as students much later in their school careers.8  
Again, the intention here is not to equate race with disadvantage, or disadvantage with 
poor parenting.  The point is that alleviating the harmful effects of social and economic 
disadvantage is an important component of any effort to reduce educational inequity.   
Of course, addressing disadvantages caused by family and community factors is 
not the only strategy for addressing educational inequity.  Indeed, a common argument 
made in the policy arena is: Because the government has relatively little control over 
what goes on in the homes and communities of children,  it has no choice but to focus 
efforts in the one place it has some control—public schools.9  One strategy is to try to 
make up for student disadvantages through extra resources.  While the effects of such 
resources are positive for disadvantaged students on the average, some researchers have 
concluded that the effects are too small to be worth the costs.10  An alternative, and 
increasingly common approach, is for state and federal governments to use higher 
standards and accountability to induce school to do more with the resources they already 
have.  On this point, evidence that some of these policies can improve educational equity 
exists, but other evidence suggests that they undermine good instruction.  Therefore, as 
with the debate on resources and funding, the results are inconsistent.11
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What is clear, no matter how the evidence is interpreted, is that no single solution 
will solve the problem.  Improving home and community environments would clearly 
help, but it is difficult (and not necessarily desirable) to try to control them.  Conversely, 
schools are somewhat easier to control, but they may not be the primary source of the 
problem and they certainly are not the sole source of its solution.  It seems evident that a 
comprehensive approach to educational inequity is necessary to substantially reduce it.   
This conclusion would not seem to be very controversial, but, as the next section 
will show, some educational reformers appear to view the matter very differently.  In 
particular, recent Education Trust and the Heritage Foundation reports suggested that the 
responsibility for educational inequity lies solely with schools.  More significantly, the 
same view underpinning these recent reports—that schools are almost entirely to blame 
for educational inequity—is also a basic assumption now embedded in educational policy 
at both the state and federal levels.12
Adopted in 2001, the federal reauthorization of the Elementary and Secondary 
Education Act, commonly known as No Child Left Behind (NCLB), requires all students 
to achieve proficiency, as measured by standardized tests, in all subjects by the year 
2014.  In the meantime, schools must make Adequate Yearly Progress (AYP) towards 
that goal or face sanctions.  To measure progress, schools must test students in all grades 
three through eight and the scores must be reported by racial and economic sub-groups.  
Moreover, all sub-groups must eventually become proficient.  For equity purposes, this 
last point is potentially important: If all students were able to reach these proficiency 
objectives, then the gap will be not just reduced, but apparently eliminated. 
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There are many things to like about NCLB, especially its apparent ambition, its 
focus on measurable student outcomes, and its stated concern for the disparities in 
outcomes among different socio-economic groups.  But the law suffers from the same 
flawed assumption as the Education Trust reports, implicitly placing all of the blame for 
educational inequity on schools.  With NCLB, schools are judged based on the levels of 
student achievement rather than how much students learn in school.  Therefore, even if a 
disadvantaged student enters kindergarten far below other students, and even if the school 
is very successful in helping the student learn, the school will still be punished if the 
student does not reach the proficiency cut off.  This is not the only way that NCLB places 
responsibility solely on schools, but it is the most important.13
The “Recent Developments” section describes the Education Trust and Heritage 
reports and shows how they invite a false interpretation.  Problems arise because the 
report’s limitations in the research methods and some related statistical issues, such as 
“regression to the mean” and use of test score “proficiency” definitions.  These issues, 
discussed in the “Available Data” section, have important implications for both the 
Education Trust reports and the measures of proficiency in NCLB. 
The “Available Data” section provides detail on the database used for the report’s 
analysis, the School-Level Achievement Database (SLAD) developed by the U.S. 
Department of Education—the same database used by Education Trust (ET) to generate 
its findings.  A description of the database follows, explaining how it provided data for 
the alternative analyses, and offers an overview of its strength and weaknesses as a 
source of information on what is actually happening in schools.  An analysis of these data 
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is provided in “Discussion and Analysis of Available Data” and, from this, the final 
section offers a series of recommendations for educators and policy makers.   
Because this study is partly about the misinterpretation of other studies, it is 
important to be clear about the purposes and appropriate uses of material presented here.  
First, this is not a study of whether NCLB will be effective in reducing the achievement 
gap.  While the data available in the SLAD are useful for the analyses presented below, 
they are not appropriate for identifying policy effects.  In addition, this is not another 
broad-based attack on NCLB.  As indicated earlier, the focus on measurable student 
outcomes—including the achievement gap—is an important positive step.  At the same 
time, the law does make some fundamentally flawed assumptions, creating problems in 
its design that need to be addressed.   
Recent Developments 
High Flyers and No Excuses 
The focus of the present study is on Education Trust’s 2001 report that identifies 
high-flying schools based on data regarding student achievement and student 
demographics.14  Specifically, the report defines “high-flying” schools as those that are 
both “high-performing” (above the 67th percentile in average state standardized test 
scores) and “high-poverty” (more than 50 percent of students are eligible for free or 
reduced price lunch).  They find 3,592 schools that meet these criteria. 
This number is problematic because it ignores the much larger number of schools 
that are unable to overcome student poverty, giving the impression that overcoming 
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poverty is relatively easy.  The number 3,592 may seem large, but, as the next section 
shows, it is actually a small fraction of the high-poverty schools around the country.   
A less obvious limitation is that the Education Trust definition does not require 
performance at a consistently high level—it requires high achievement in only one 
subject and considers only one grade and one year.  As a result, it would call a school 
“high-flying” even if students could not read or do basic math.  Moreover, it does not 
require that schools produce high achievement over time or in multiple grade levels.  This 
leads to misidentification of high-flyers and overstatement of the total number, as shown 
in the analysis in the later sections. 
In March, 2002, Education Trust followed this with additional analyses that used 
different definitions of high performance in an attempt to address some of these 
criticisms.15  They also try to minimize the problem with their earlier definitions, writing 
that “no single definition of high performance—or high-poverty or high-minority, for that 
matter—will work for all research purposes.”16  This is undoubtedly true, but it misses 
the point of the critique.  Different definitions are appropriate under different situations, 
but some definitions of high performance should not be used except when absolutely 
necessary.  To educators and education researchers, it is well known that individual test 
scores are unreliable measures of student achievement that vary dramatically from year-
to-year and grade-to-grade even when school effectiveness is unchanged.  Any definition 
that does not take this into account will likely yield misleading results no matter what 
type of research is being done. 
The Education Trust report authors also write in support of their original 
performance definition that “we know from our own work in schools across the country 
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that the reforms that take hold in one subject and one grade level can provide the basis for 
improvements in other grades and subject areas.”  This is almost certainly true, but 
schools that are improving should eventually achieve high scores in more than one 
subject, grade, and year.  Without identifying schools that have improved in this way, it is 
difficult to learn how improvement takes place.  In short, the performance definition in 
the original Education Trust report is ill-suited for the stated task. 
Inviting Misinterpretation 
It is easier to understand the origin of these methodological flaws when 
considering how these organizations view educational inequity and reform.  Consider the 
words of Kati Haycock, Director of the Education Trust (ET).  She asks, “How many 
effective schools do we have to see in this country before we conclude that it’s not about 
the kids?”17  One possible interpretation of this quote is that some students grow up under 
adverse circumstances, placing them at a disadvantage in their school activities.  
Therefore, it may not be “about the kids,” but rather about the conditions under which 
they live and grow.  This interpretation is consistent with the research evidence.   
But Haycock’s words invite an alternative interpretation.  If we ignore the fact 
that harsh family and community conditions hurt children, then the choice is between 
blaming the schools and believing that some students are incapable of learning no matter 
what schools do.  To see why, consider the foot-race analogy made by President Lyndon 
Johnson when he argued for affirmative action and compensatory education.  Johnson 
said that undernourished students would lose the vast majority of the running races, not 
because the students or track coach failed to try hard enough, but because the students 
 
This document is available on the Education Policy Studies Laboratory website at: 
http://www.asu.edu/educ/epsl/EPRU/documents/EPSL-0603-120-EPRU.pdf  
Page 7 of 32
were undernourished.  Haycock’s words imply that we should ignore the under-
nourishment and other social and economic disadvantages.    
The unfortunate result is that the Education Trust studies set up a false choice—a 
choice between blaming the students and blaming the schools.  Given this choice, one can 
only blame the schools.  And indeed, this is exactly what happened when the report was 
released: 
“People who follow education issues have long known that some schools succeed  
with children from families with weak educational backgrounds.  But it turns out 
[according to the recent Education Trust report] that it’s not just a few, rare 
schools that succeed, it’s thousands of schools  . . . We’d better not hear that racist 
nonsense anymore.”  Bill Evers, Research Fellow, Hoover Institution, Brainstorm 
NW Magazine, February, 2002. 
According to Evers, you either believe that the schools are to blame or you 
believe in racist nonsense.  But this view completely ignores the fact that family and 
community factors play a critical role.  The belief that these factors are important is far 
from racism.  Indeed, ignoring these family and community factors only reinforces the 
false view that some students are incapable.  Unfortunately, the Evers quote is just one of 
many examples of how the Education Trust results have been interpreted.18
Heritage Foundation, No Excuses 
The recent Education Trust reports share many similarities with a 1999 report 
published by the conservative Heritage Foundation, entitled, No Excuses.19  Its analysis 
started with approximately 400 schools brought to its attention from various sources, 
including state education agencies, think tanks, teachers’ unions, and foundations.  Like 
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the Education Trust report, the authors of the Heritage study narrowed this list to 125 
schools that had high concentrations of poverty and high test scores.  Its specific criteria 
were also similar—to be on the list, test scores had to be in the top-third of the state and 
at least 75 percent of the students had to be eligible for free and reduced lunch (instead of 
50 percent in the Education Trust report).  From this list of 125 schools, 21 were selected 
for site visits and further study. 
The most significant problem with the Heritage report is that nearly all of the 
schools considered, while perhaps very effective, had unique resources or student 
populations that had little to do with the school’s effort.  For example, nine of the 21 
schools had admission requirements that could exclude students who have received low 
test scores.  Overall, a more careful analysis shows that only three of the 21 schools could 
be considered high-flyers.20  Much could be learned from these schools, but the Heritage 
study masks the lessons of the analysis rather than learning from them. 
In the foreword to No Excuses, Adam Myerson, then-Vice-President of 
Educational Affairs at the Heritage Foundation, states that some people would “dismiss 
such achievement as a fluke . . . the work of extraordinary heroes whose performance 
cannot possibly be held as a national standard” (p.2).  Myerson is right that the high 
scores in these schools are no “fluke.”  What he fails to recognize from his own 
information is that high performance of many schools can be explained substantially by 
systematic differences in family and school resources that are outside educators’ control.     
The NCLB Connection 
The connection between the Education Trust and Heritage reports and No Child 
Left Behind (NCLB) is important to point out.  In particular, these reports and the new 
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law all assume that schools are mainly, or even solely, responsible for educational 
inequity.  In the case of the Education Trust reports, this appears to be a conclusion of the 
data analysis, but the discussion above shows the analysis only reinforces the authors’ 
misguided assumptions.  With NCLB, the same assumptions are revealed by the fact—
not widely recognized—that schools are not actually punished or rewarded for what 
schools contribute to student learning.  Instead, the law provides incentives for schools 
based on the percent of students who reach proficiency.  This may sound reasonable; 
however, it completely ignores the vast differences in where students start—as 
documented by the research cited earlier on kindergartners.  This means that many 
schools will be punished for family and community factors that are outside of their 
control—and therefore assumes that schools are solely responsible for inequity. 
Methodological Issues 
The false assumption that schools are primarily responsible for educational 
inequity is also reinforced by certain methodological limitations of the Education Trust 
reports and the federal law.  These are related to two factors: regression to the mean and 
the use of proficiency definitions.   
Regression to the Mean 
Researchers assume that all measures are made up of two parts: (1) the true 
portion, or “signal,” which is the part of greatest interest, and (2) “noise.”  Noise is 
assumed to be random in the sense that it is unrelated to the signal portion of the measure.  
In addition, the expected value of the noise for each individual is zero.  This means that 
observed measure is different from the true value, but the direction and size of the 
difference are unclear.   
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One effect of statistical noise is called “regression to the mean.”  For instance, 
suppose you flipped a coin ten times and obtained nine “heads” and one “tails.”  Such a 
pattern cannot go on forever.  If you continued flipping, the average number of heads 
would gradually converge to 50 percent.  More generally, if we repeat any measure, the 
average will tend to shift towards the expected or mean value.  It is therefore easy to see 
why the concept is called “regression to the mean.” 
This effect also occurs with schools and test scores.  If a school achieves a very 
high score, it is likely that some, though certainly not all, of this high performance is 
caused by positive noise—factors outside of the school’s control but that nonetheless 
affect measured student test scores.  Because noise is considered random, it is unlikely 
that the same school will experience positive noise for all other tests.  Other attempts will 
likely produce lower scores unless the school is truly exceptional. 
Unfortunately, some recent studies show that the signal-to-noise ratio of 
standardized test scores is very low, implying that the role of regression to the mean can 
be quite large.21  As a practical matter, this means that adding additional test scores (e.g., 
test from additional grades, subjects, and years) could significantly change measured 
levels of achievement in many schools.  Because such additions reduce the effect of 
regression to the mean, and help us come closer to the real achievement levels, it is 
important that the additional data be included.   
The effect of statistical noise is further complicated when schools are separated 
into low-poverty and high-poverty categories—as is the case in the Education Trust 
study—because the two groups have a different expected score.  A concrete example may 
help to illustrate.  Consider a typical high-poverty school, School H, and a typical low-
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poverty school, School L.  If there were no noise, School H would achieve the 40th 
percentile and School L would reach the 70th percentile.  While the expected effect of 
noise is zero, suppose that each school has a 20 percent chance of receiving positive noise 
equal to 30 percentile points (i.e., noise that raises reported scores above true scores) and 
a 20 percent chance of experiencing equally-sized but negative noise.  Now, suppose that 
in year one, School H experiences positive noise and therefore reaches the higher-than-
expected 70th percentile, and School L experiences no noise, and therefore reaches the 
expected 70th percentile.  Both schools are high-performing according to the definitions 
used in the Education Trust analysis. 
However, the odds of this happening again are slim.  There is only a 20 percent 
chance that School H will experience positive noise again, so the school will probably 
switch from the high-performing group to the low-performing group.  School L, in 
contrast, has an 80 percent chance of remaining high-performing because there is only a 
20 percent chance that it will experience negative noise large enough to decrease its 
percentile below the cut score.   
What this means for the analysis of achievement gaps is: (1) all schools that 
appear high-performing at any given point in time may actually be average or below; and 
(2) just as importantly, this false identification is much more likely to occur with high-
poverty schools.  The results in the “Evaluation of Available Data” section below confirm 
this effect and also demonstrate why it is essential to use a substantial number of scores 
when trying to identify school performance.22
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Proficiency and “Cut Scores” 
There are many different types of standardized tests and many ways to report 
them.  One general approach reports school test scores as averages of the scores from 
individual students.  Such measures incorporate the performance of all students, and 
therefore improvement by any given student, no matter their initial level of achievement, 
appears as a slightly higher school average. 
An alternative approach is to create a “cut score” and use it to distinguish between 
“proficient” students who score above the cut and “non-proficient” students who score 
below the cut.  The purpose of this approach is to establish a minimum benchmark that 
all students are expected to attain.  This is certainly a reasonable means to understand the 
overall level of achievement among broad groups of students.  These cut scores, however, 
are problematic when used for the sake of school accountability.  One problem is that 
accountability systems using cut scores create an environment where schools focus all of 
their attention on the students who are just below or just above the cut score because the 
other students are likely to remain in the same category even if the school devotes little 
attention to them.  A second problem, as indicated earlier, is that even a highly effective 
school might not be able to help a student who starts off far behind to achieve at the same 
level as other students. 
One prominent education scholar, Richard Rothstein, writes that the specific cut 
score chosen for analysis purposes causes “great mischief” with the measure of 
achievement.23  He argues, for example, that an extremely low cut score is likely to be 
reached by high percentages of students in all groups, making the achievement gap seem 
small.  Conversely, very low percentages of students in all groups will reach extremely 
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high cut scores, resulting in a similarly low achievement gap.  As a result, Rothstein 
writes, “critics can make the test score gap seem extraordinarily large if they define 
proficiency about halfway between the average score for blacks and the average score for 
whites.”24
This is illustrated in Figure 1 below which displays realistic test score 
distributions for disadvantaged and advantaged students. The bell-shaped distribution to 
the left has a lower test score mean and reflects the distribution of disadvantaged 
students.  The other similarly shaped curve has a higher mean score and reflects 
advantaged students.  Two cut scores are also shown.  At the first, nearly half of the 
disadvantaged students are proficient, but at the second, almost none of them are. 
The two score distributions and two cut scores illustrate why the two groups of 
students are affected differently by changes in the cut score.  Specifically, a small change 
in cut score 1 will have a larger effect on the proportion of disadvantaged students 
passing the exam.  For cut score 2, the opposite is true; now, the advantaged group is 
affected more.  More generally, when a policymaker moves the cut score closer to the 
intersection of the two distributions, the gap will appear larger.  While this requires other 
assumptions, it does illustrate and clarify Rothstein’s point that the cut score causes 
“great mischief.”25
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Figure 1: Effect of the Cut Score on Different Student Groups 
# of 
students 
Disadvantaged Advantaged 
Distribution Distribution 
Test score Cut score 1  Cut score 2  
 
As we will see below, this has important implications for NCLB because the law 
encourages states to define proficiency at a very low level (closer to cut score 1), making 
the achievement gap seem small. 
Available Data 
The recent Education Trust reports are based on a database created by the U.S. 
Department of Education, the School-Level Achievement Database (SLAD).  When used 
properly, the SLAD is potentially useful for identifying high-flying schools.  It is 
important, however, to understand both the promise and the limitations of this tool.  The 
following sections offer a general description of the database and provide an overview of 
SLAD’s general advantages and limitations. 
The SLAD has a total useable sample of 62,074 schools (74 percent of all public 
schools in the country) that enroll 36 million students (78 percent of the total).  For most 
schools in the SLAD, information is included about the percentage of students in various 
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racial and ethnic categories and the percentage of students eligible for free or reduced 
lunch.26  Information about school location (urban, rural, etc.), school type (charter, 
magnet, and traditional public), and school grade levels (elementary, middle, and high 
schools) is also included. 
The data for this new analysis study are from the years 1997-2000.  More recent 
data are available; however, there are two reasons for using the older data.  First, by using 
data before NCLB was adopted, it is possible to avoid the issue of whether NCLB has 
affected test scores, positively or negatively.  Second, the older data include those used 
by Education Trust in their 2001 report, making it easier to compare results across the 
two studies.27
For these years, test scores are reported in the SLAD for all U.S. states, except 
Iowa, South Dakota, and West Virginia.28  In some of the 47 included states, there is no 
standardized test at the high school level; therefore, such schools are also excluded.  
Every state gives a different achievement test and reports these results in different ways.29  
One useful feature of the SLAD is that it includes data from multiple cut scores in many 
states, making it possible to illustrate some of the points made in the previous section.   
Schools are divided into three levels: elementary, middle, and high school.  
Where possible, the following grades were chosen: grade five for elementary school, 
grade eight for middle school, and grade 12 for high school.  In cases where scores were 
not available at these grades, the next lowest grade was used (e.g., grade four was used 
instead of grade five).  The analysis compares schools within the same general grade 
levels, e.g., elementary schools are only compared with other elementary schools, not 
middle schools.30
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For some states, information is available for multiple grades, years, and subjects.  
In some states, at least eight test scores are available for each school—two subjects and 
two grades for two consecutive years.  This “multiple scores” sample includes 18,365 of 
the 62,074 schools.  Of these, 14,124 are elementary schools, 4,241 are middle schools, 
and none are high schools.  
Strengths and Limitations of the SLAD 
The SLAD is apparently the only database that comes close to providing school 
demographic and achievement information for all schools in the U.S.  Other data sets 
provide richer information for small samples of students and schools that are assumed to 
be nationally representative.  The SLAD provides less depth, but includes a near census 
of all U.S. public schools, allowing for detailed comparisons across states and reducing 
reliance on sampling assumptions. 
It is important to emphasize that every state uses a different standardized test, 
which makes it difficult in the SLAD to make direct comparisons between schools 
located in different states.  The Education Trust reports use the state tests to calculate 
each school’s percentile ranking within the state.  In some sense, this creates a common 
scale for all schools in the database, but it is does not solve the problem.  A school at the 
40th percentile in North Dakota has a different level of achievement than one scoring at 
the same percentile in Montana.  Therefore, when possible, the present study uses within-
state analysis to make specific points. 
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Discussion and Analysis of Available Data 
New Evidence about High Flyers 
Table 1 reports the percentage of schools in each of four poverty/performance 
categories.  The table uses the Education Trust definitions of high-poverty (50 percent of 
the school’s students eligible for free and reduced lunches) and high-performance (the 
school is in the top-third of the state in either reading or math). 
Only 16 percent of high-poverty schools are high-performing, compared with 54 
percent of low-poverty schools.  This means that low-poverty schools are three times 
more likely to be high performing than high-poverty schools.  Notice also that 34 percent 
of all schools are high-poverty.  Roughly 11.8 million students attend these schools.  This 
large number reinforces the importance of reliably identifying high-flyers and learning 
from their effective practices. 
Table 1 also provides the same information for schools with high levels of 
poverty and large portions of minority students.  The results are even more disparate.  In 
this case, only 10 percent of high-poverty-high-minority schools are high-performing, 
compared with 57 percent of low-poverty-low-minority schools, making them six times 
as likely to reach this high achievement level.31
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Table 1: Poverty, Race, and Achievement in U.S. Public Schools  
% in each performance category Category 
(ET definitions) 
Number of Schools 
(% total sample) 
Low High 
Low-Poverty  40,830  (66%) 46 54 
High-Poverty 21,234  (34%) 84 16 
Total 62,064  (100%)   
Low-Poverty-Low-
Minority 38,104 (61%) 43 57 
High-Poverty-
High-Minority 12,869 (21%) 90 10 
Total 50,973 (82%)   
 
Accounting for regression to the mean 
The above section uses the Education Trust definition of performance, which 
requires high-performance in either reading or math in the grade and year selected by 
Education Trust for analysis.  This section considers the implications of this by providing 
analysis of the 18,365 schools in the “multiple scores” sample.  Table 2 below shows the 
percentages of low- and high-poverty schools that are high-performing when various 
combinations of high scores are required.  For instance, the first definition (1-1-1) refers 
to those schools that are high-performing in either year, either subject, and either grade.  
Because there are two subjects and two grades (four chances) and two years (giving four 
additional chances), each school has eight chances to get in the top-third just one time to 
become a high-performer.  The 2-1-1 definition is somewhat more demanding, requiring 
that schools are high-performing in both years, in either subject, and in either grade.  This 
definition requires more consistency than the one above.  The degree of stringency 
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continues to increase up to the 2-2-2 definition, which requires schools to be high-
performing in both years, both grades, and both subjects.  Here, schools must have high 
test scores with a high degree of consistency. 
Table 2 reports the percentage of low- and high-poverty schools that would be 
judged high-performing based on each of these definitions.  Row 9 shows how schools 
would place on the basis of the Education Trust definition, which simply requires a 
school to be in the state’s top-third in reading or math in one grade and year; it stands 
apart because Education Trust does not consider multiple years or multiple grades.  The 
table’s last row indicates the “erosion” of performance between the Education Trust 
definition of performance and the 2-2-2 definition.  That is, it indicates what portion of 
schools drop off the high-performance list as criteria increasingly require consistent high-
performance. 
 
Table 2: Consistency of High-Performance 
 
 
 
Criteria Row 
Years Subjects Grades 
% high-
poverty 
schools that 
are high-
performing 
% low-
poverty 
schools that 
are high-
performing 
% high-
poverty, 
high-
minority 
schools that 
are high-
performing 
% low-
poverty, 
low-
minority 
schools that 
are high-
performing 
1 1 1 1 30.5 80.0 22.0 84.0 
2 2 1 1 12.9 59.1 7.5 63.5 
3 1 2 1 14.7 62.3 9.1 66.8 
4 1 1 2 11.0 56.5 6.4 60.9 
5 2 2 1 4.5 41.0 2.0 44.8 
6 2 1 2 3.6 37.9 1.4 41.4 
7 1 2 2 2.4 33.2 0.9 36.4 
8 2 2 2 1.1 24.2 0.3 26.7 
9 Education Trust Definition 15.6 54.2 10.4 56.7 
10 Erosion (from row 9 to row 8) 93 % 55 % 97 % 53 % 
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The results suggest considerable decline in the percentages of schools that are 
high-performing as more consistency is required.  As the earlier discussion of statistical 
noise indicated, any single measurement can be affected by external factors, and it is 
unlikely that a low-performing school that benefited from positive noise in one particular 
year would be able to sustain its high-performance ranking for two years.  These results 
offer evidence supporting the earlier hypothesis that the designation of high-poverty, 
high-performing schools will be disproportionately affected by regression to the mean.   
Indeed, the percentage of high-poverty schools achieving high performance 
declines from 15.6 percent using the Education Trust definition (Table 2, row 9) to 1.1 
percent using the 2-2-2 definition (Table 2, row 8).  This means that 93 percent of schools 
identified as high-flyers using the Education Trust approach are not high-flyers when 
consistency is required.  The percentage also erodes for low-poverty schools, but not as 
much.  The percentage of low-poverty schools achieving high performance declines from 
54.2 percent using the Education Trust definition (Table 2, row 9) to 24.2 percent using 
the 2-2-2 definition (Table 2, row 8).  This yields an erosion rate of 55 percent for low-
poverty schools, considerably lower than the 93 percent found for high-poverty schools.  
The higher erosion rate for high-poverty schools confirms that the effect of regression to 
the mean plays a greater role in these schools, as explained earlier.   
A further implication is that the probability of a high-poverty school reaching 
high-performance is much lower than the 2001 Education Trust report suggested.  Recall 
that the results from Table 1, using the Education Trust definitions, suggested that low-
poverty schools were three times as likely to be high-performing compared with high-
poverty schools.  Table 2 suggests that this number rises quickly when the performance 
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definition requires more consistency.  The definition requiring the most consistency (row 
8), which nearly eliminates the effect of regression to the mean, suggests that low-
poverty schools are 22 times as likely to be high-performing.32  The intuition behind this 
change is straightforward: both types of schools are less likely to be high-performing 
with the more restrictive definition, but the rate of erosion is higher for high-poverty 
schools.  Therefore, the probability of high-poverty school reaching high-performance 
drops quickly compared with low-poverty schools.  
Table 2 also provides evidence regarding schools that are high-poverty and high-
minority.  The initial portion of high-poverty, high-minority schools that are high 
performing is smaller than for high-poverty-only schools, consistent with the results in 
Table 1.  The rate of erosion is also higher here, reaching 97 percent from the previous 93 
percent.  Further, the likelihood that a low-poverty-low-minority school is high 
performing is 89 times greater than for a high-poverty-high-minority school. 
Accounting for proficiency definitions 
This section tests whether the performance of high-poverty schools is sensitive to 
the cut score.  Table 3 compares the math achievement for schools in Michigan and 
Florida, two states that reported results for each school using multiple cut scores.33  First, 
the most noticeable differences are the levels of the cut scores across the two states.  For 
these years, Michigan had relatively low cut scores, allowing high percentages of schools 
in all poverty categories to reach high performance, even with the highest cut score.  For 
example, 85 percent of Michigan’s high-poverty elementary schools reached the lowest 
cut score.  This suggests that Michigan’s cut scores are closer to “cut score 1” in Figure 
1. 
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Florida, in contrast, uses more cut scores and has a much wider range of students 
passing.  The lowest cut score appears more like “cut score 1” in Figure 1, while the 
highest cut score is more like “cut score 2.”  These definitions are of course somewhat 
arbitrary in both states and the point here is simply to illustrate the influence of these 
choices.   
The last column most clearly illustrates the point that the achievement gap 
appears largest when using cut scores that are closest to the intersection of the test score 
distributions for advantaged and disadvantaged students.  In Michigan, the difference in 
the percentages of students passing between low- and high-poverty schools is relatively 
low with the lowest cut score, but the gap widens moving to the highest cut score—that 
is, closer to the intersection of the two distributions of scores shown in Figure 1. 
A similar pattern is observed in Florida, when shifting from the lowest to the 
middle cut score.  Interestingly, the difference between low- and high-poverty schools 
decreases again when shifting from the middle to the highest cut score.  The apparent 
reason is that the middle cut score is near the intersection of the advantaged and 
disadvantaged student distributions—where the gap is greatest.  Shifting from the middle 
to the highest standard therefore shifts the cut score away from the intersection of the test 
score distributions for advantaged and disadvantaged students.  Thus, the results from 
Florida also reinforce Rothstein’s point, although the point is made somewhat differently 
because of the wide range of scores used in that state. 
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Table 3: Role of the State Proficiency Definitions, Individual States 
Cut Scores 
Average % of 
students 
reaching cut 
score in high-
poverty schools
(a) 
Average % of 
students 
reaching cut 
score in low-
poverty 
schools 
(b) 
Difference 
(b)-(a) 
Michigan     
Elementary    
Lowest Cut Score 85.0 94.4 9.4 
Highest Cut Score 63.2 80.8 17.6 
Middle    
Lowest Cut Score 70.2 89.2 19.0 
Highest Cut Score 38.7 67.3 28.6 
    
Florida     
Elementary    
Lowest Cut Score 65.6 83.4 17.8 
Middle Cut Score 34.7 56.3 21.6 
Highest Cut Score 14.3 28.8 14.5 
Middle    
Lowest Cut Score 56.5 79.2 22.7 
Middle Cut Score 34.6 59.8 25.2 
Highest Cut Score 12.6 28.6 16.0 
 
NCLB Revisited 
Consider again the connection between these results and NCLB.  First, the new 
federal law is based on the lowest state cut scores, such as those in Table 3 for Florida 
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and Michigan.  These definitions have been criticized because they are somewhat 
arbitrary and because the law indirectly encourages states to create definitions of 
proficiency that are easy for students to reach.  These concerns are all valid.  And the 
present discussion adds another to the list: NCLB makes the achievement gap look 
smaller than it is in reality.  For instance, the results in Table 3 for Michigan suggest that 
the gap between low- and high-poverty schools is as low as 9.4 percent points.  While not 
directly comparable to the achievement gaps described in the above “Background” 
section, the number does give an impression that the problem is relatively small.  In short, 
NCLB may have the effect of reducing the gap simply by defining it away.   
But even this problem should not distract us from the more fundamental flaw—
NCLB assumes that schools are solely responsible for student achievement.  This 
assumption is misguided, given the strong evidence regarding the role of poverty and 
students’ home and community environments.   
Recommendations 
This study has re-analyzed data from recent reports that purport to show large 
numbers of “high-flying” schools, which they then use as evidence to suggest that 
overcoming social and economic disadvantage is relatively easy.  Three flaws have been 
identified.     
First, Table 2 shows that, after accounting for regression to the mean and 
requiring consistent high performance, the number of high flyers seems quite small.  For 
example, a low-poverty-low minority school is 89 times more likely to be high-
performing than one that is high-poverty-high-minority.  
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Second, the logic of the high flyer argument is also flawed.  Even if there were 
large numbers of high flyers, this would say relatively little about the role of social and 
economic disadvantages.  Much better evidence on this question comes from research on 
kindergartners whose achievement cannot reasonably be attributed to schools.  That 
evidence shows that students start school almost as far behind as when they finish school.  
While schools must take some responsibility for these gaps, the evidence shows clearly 
students’ disadvantages are the primary cause behind the achievement gaps. 
Third, the notion that schools are solely responsible for educational inequity is a 
basic, but entirely misguided, assumption of state and federal education policy, including  
No Child Left Behind.  The related emphasis on school accountability, most commonly 
based on cut scores, and the federal focus on minimum proficiency together work to 
distort the size of a critical achievement gap that needs serious attention and intervention.  
Instead, as shown in Table 3, it is more likely that NCLB will “reduce” the achievement 
gap simply by redefining it.   
It is therefore recommended that:  
1. Policy makers continue the recent focus on measurable student outcomes, 
such as test scores, but redesign policies to hold educators accountable only 
for those factors within their control;  
2. Policy makers take a comprehensive approach to school improvement that 
starts in schools, but extends into homes and communities, addressing basic 
disadvantages caused by poverty; and  
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3. All educational stakeholders acknowledge that educational inequity is caused 
by problems in both schools and communities—and avoid trying to blame the 
problem on schools alone.   
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